It is not a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act to rent an apartment to an alien so long as the landlord does not prevent or take any affirmative steps to prevent government authorities from detecting the alien’s unlawful presence.

Delrio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc.

Residents of a multi-dwelling complex alleged that the owners actively sought out illegal aliens as prospective tenants because their immigration status made it easy for the owners to exploit such tenants in violation of state and federal statutes. The residents also alleged that the owners segregated their apartment buildings according to impermissible criteria to avoid confrontation amongst the building’s residents. Certain of the residents sued the apartment complex owner in federal court.

The United States District Court granted the owner’s motion to dismiss, holding that, absent proof that the landlord had engaged in some other unlawful conduct, it was not a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) to rent an apartment to an alien. The Court found that even if the landlord knew that some of its tenants were illegal aliens, so long as it did not prevent or take any affirmative steps to prevent government authorities from detecting the aliens’ unlawful presence, it did not violate the statute. The Court also held that providing aliens with obvious information that any fugitive would know was not an activity in violation of the RICO. It noted that even if the owner had segregated its residents, such behavior could not be seen as taking an affirmative step to conceal illegal aliens’ presence from authorities.

The United States District Court also found that the owner’s behavior did not “encourage” or “induce” a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Merely providing housing, the Court ruled, was not enough to constitute an INA violation.

Home Warranty Companies' Payments to Real Estate Brokers and Agents

June 25, 2010 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

24 CFR Part 3500

[Docket No. FR-5425-IA-01]

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA): Home Warranty

Companies' Payments to Real Estate Brokers and Agents

AGENCY: Office of General Counsel, HUD.

ACTION: Interpretive rule.

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SUMMARY: Under section 8 of RESPA and HUD's implementing RESPA regulations, services performed by real estate brokers and agents as additional settlement services in a real estate transaction are compensable if the services are actual, necessary and distinct from the primary services provided by the real estate broker or agent, the services are not nominal, and the payment is not a duplicative charge.

A referral is not a compensable service for which a broker or agent may receive compensation. This rule interprets section 8 of RESPA and HUD's regulations as they apply to the compensation provided by home warranty companies to real estate brokers and agents. Although interpretive rules are exempt from public comment under the Administrative Procedure Act, HUD nevertheless welcomes public comment on this interpretation.

Town Point Center West

4801-A Virginia Beach Blvd
4801-A Virginia Beach Blvd.

Virginia Beach, VA

DIRT DEVELOPMENT for Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Daniel B. Bogart
Donley and Marjorie Bollinger Chair in Real Estate Law
Chapman University School of Law
Orange, California

I heard one interesting suggestion – if residential loans just can’t be handled reasonably within the trusts, then the federal government could condemn all of the mortgages held in RMBS and restructure them however the government believes is appropriate.  The trusts could then take the condemnation proceeds (after how much litigation on value?) and distribute them to their investors pursuant to the loan documents.   This is a lunatic idea with a ton of problems.   But somehow, in light of what is coming out of Washington every  day, it is seeming less and less crazy to me. 

Marshall

Competition Realty Breaking News Alert
Washington, Commerce Department
Friday, January 30, 2009 -- 8:41 AM ET
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Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc., 276 Va. 64, 661 S.E.2d 404 (2008)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

In an action for specific performance of a purported oral contract for the sale of real property, the circuit court erred in finding that various notes, memoranda, and draft agreements circulated between the parties were sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, Code § 11-2. The circuit court also erred in finding that one of the property owners acted as the agent of the sellers and in granting the prospective purchasers specific performance based upon equitable estoppel and part performance of the purported contract. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and final judgment is entered in favor of the sellers.

Record No. 070988

Decided: June 6, 2008

Present: All the Justices

Real Property — Contracts — Oral Agreement to Enter Into a Contract — Presumption of Intent to Embody Final Agreement in a Writing — Exchanging of Multiple Drafts — Notes, Memoranda, and Communications — Mutuality of Assent — Requisite Agreement as to Contract Terms — Agency — Insufficient Evidence of Agency — Performance or Breach — Defenses to Enforcement — Statute of Frauds — Equitable Estoppel to Assert Defense — Partial Performance — Code § 11-2

Several family members and a certain trust, each of whom owned an undivided interest in a 200 acre family farm near a mountain lake resort, desired to sell the property to a developer who would agree to certain restrictions and conditions to assure that the property, located adjacent to their own individual residences, would be appropriately developed into an upscale residential neighborhood. After soliciting proposals from several prospective purchasers, the family members accepted the individual plaintiff's proposal, which provided for a purchase price of $1.7 million and an express promise to abide by their desired restrictions regarding development. One of the family members, who had agreed to serve as liaison between the family members and the prospective purchaser, then began negotiating with the individual plaintiff towards a final written purchase agreement embodying all of the desired provisions, conditions, and other necessary specific terms of the sale. Plaintiff and the family members exchanged a number of electronic mail communications, facsimile communications, notes, and interim draft purchase agreements pertaining to and reflecting some, but not all, of the various terms, amendments, and additional conditions desired by the parties. After approximately 18 months, despite the various [Page 65] documents and communications exchanged between the parties, none of the interim draft purchase agreements — including the last draft sent by the individual plaintiff — contained all of the terms and conditions desired and none was ever signed on behalf of both the purchaser and the sellers. Nevertheless, during this period, the individual plaintiff — unbeknownst to the family members — had contracted to resell the property to another developer for $3 million. Approximately two months after receiving the last draft of the purchase agreement from the individual plaintiff, and still desiring to sell the family farm property, the family members sold the property to another developer for $2.6 million. The individual plaintiff and his development company, to whom he had intended to assign his interests in the agreement for the purchase of the family farm property, subsequently sued, alleging that they had a binding contract obligating the family members to sell them the family farm property for the previously agreed-upon purchase price of $1.7 million, that the multiple written communications and documents exchanged between the parties satisfied the statute of frauds, and that, in any event, equitable estoppel and part performance justified granting them specific performance because they had incurred certain costs and had taken other certain actions in furtherance of and in reliance upon the parties' agreement. Following a bench trial, the circuit court agreed with plaintiffs and awarded them specific performance of the purported contact. This appeal followed.